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Abstract 
 
Resting state provides an important condition to study depressogenic cognition as 
neuropsychological studies have associated rest with heightened self-related processing. We 
examined outside the fMRI scanner relationships between rest-related internal focus, 
cognitive reactivity (vs. mindfulness), rumination, and negative mood in an undergraduate 
sample (N=80). We tested a theory-based (Marchetti et al., 2012) effect by which, in presence 
of cognitive risk (vs. protective) factors, internal focus lowers mood via ruminative self-focus. 
Such effect was detected in individuals with high cognitive reactivity, whereas brooding only 
showed an incremental effect. On the contrary, this dynamic was not significant in individuals 
with low cognitive reactivity, despite the level of brooding, or high mindfulness. These results 
provide an important window on risk for depressogenic thought during resting state. 
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 “A mind quite vacant is a mind distress’d” 
- William Cowper (1731 – 1800) 
1. Introduction 
Resting state is defined as a state of relaxed wakefulness during which one is not 
actively engaged in any task, but one’s mind is free to wander off. Despite such apparent 
idleness, our mind is constantly active and tends to gravitate towards internally-originated 
scenarios (e.g. daydreaming, involuntary autobiographical memories, etc.). In recent years, 
neurobiological research has confirmed such notion, highlighting that several large-scale 
neural networks intensively perpetuate their activation during rest (Broyd et al., 2009). 
Neuroimaging studies indicate that resting state (i.e. people quietly lie in the scanner with 
eyes closed) is associated with a neural network which shows a tight temporally synchronized 
co-activation of brain areas (Fox et al., 2005), the so-called Default Mode Network (DMN; 
Raichle et al., 2001). The DMN consists of two highly linked sub-networks showing 
anticorrelated activation, namely the Task Negative Network (TN) and the Task Positive 
Network (TP) (Broyd et al., 2009). TN is comprised of brain areas that are typically active 
during rest, such as medioprefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate (Raichle et al., 2001).  
Interestingly, several psychological functions have been proposed to be embedded in 
the TN, such as autobiographical recalling, future prospection, self-referential thinking, and 
associative processing (Buckner et al., 2008). Broadly speaking, TN is thought to subserve 
internal focus, during which internally-generated information dominates (Fox et al., 2005) 
and self-related processing occurs (Northoff, 2012). TP consists of brain areas (e.g. 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex) that are particularly active during 
non-specific task engagement, such as attention demanding tasks (Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). For these reasons, TP is the putative neural substrate of external attentional focus (Fox 
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et al., 2005). In sum, the DMN is a resting state network comprising highly anticorrelated 
oscillations between internal and external focus. Given the pivotal role of the DMN in both 
self-related internal focus and task-related engagement, DMN aberrations could play a major 
role in psychopathology (Broyd et al., 2009). For instance, increased TN activation during 
rest is found in depression and schizophrenia (for a review see, Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 
2012). In depression, there is emerging data on the association between TN and maladaptive 
self-related processing, such as rumination (Berman et al., 2011). However, to date resting 
state studies have mostly examined isolated risk factors. Recently a comprehensive theoretical 
framework has been proposed relating various cognitive risk factors for depression to the 
DMN (Marchetti, Koster, Sonuga-Barke, & De Raedt, 2012). The authors proposed that 
impaired attentional control, rumination, and cognitive reactivity are outcomes of DMN 
dysfunctions. The present study examines resting state in relation to rumination and cognitive 
reactivity at the behavioral level
1
.  
Rumination has been defined as “repetitively focusing on the fact that one is 
depressed; on one's symptoms of depression; and on the causes, meanings, and consequences 
of depressive symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p.569). The deleterious impact of 
rumination may not derive from attention to distress per se, but from internally-oriented 
attention that is negative, evaluative, and judgmental (Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007). Indeed, 
recent literature shows rumination to have its neural roots in increased TN activation during 
rest (Hamilton et al., 2011). Mainly, brooding -the most maladaptive form of rumination (i.e. 
passively focusing on the presence and meaning of symptoms of distress; Treynor, Gonzalez, 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003)-, is related to TN during rest (Berman et al., 2011). On the 
contrary, reflection (i.e. the degree to which individuals engage in problem solving to improve 
mood), considered as the more adaptive form of rumination, is negatively associated with 
temporal dominance of TN over TP (Hamilton et al., 2011). In sum, Marchetti et al. (2012) 
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proposed that during rest increased TN activity is specifically associated with higher levels of 
maladaptive rumination (i.e. brooding). 
The second rest-related risk factor is cognitive reactivity, namely fluctuations in the 
activation of negative self-attitudes in response to stressors (Butler, Hokanson, & Flynn, 
1994). The ease by which negative self-related thinking is triggered is accounted for by the 
Differential Activation Hypothesis (DAH; Teasdale, 1988). In brief, the DAH postulates that 
depressive episodes strengthen associative links between negative self-schemata, negative 
mood, and negative thinking, so that even mild stressors can activate a negative cascade in 
self-attitudes, depressive thinking, and related behavioral outcomes (e.g., depressive 
withdrawal). However, cognitive reactivity has been recently conceptualized as a process 
which can be observed also in at-risk individuals who never suffered from clinical depression 
(Moulds et al., 2008). Crucial for our study, the construct of cognitive reactivity assumes the 
existence of negative self-schemata, which are “latent but reactive” (Segal & Shaw, 1986). 
Once activated negative schemata can bias self-related processing in a maladaptive way. In 
keeping with this, Marchetti et al. (2012) hypothesized that during rest increased TN activity 
could neurobiologically support such “latent but reactive” negative self-schemata. Although 
there is some overlap between brooding and cognitive reactivity, brooding is considered part 
of stable tendency to ruminate (Treynor et al., 2003) whereas cognitive reactivity is clearly 
defined in relation to the encounter of stress (Teasdale, 1988).  
Related to the association between TN and cognitive reactivity, Marchetti et al. (2012) 
also proposed an inversed relation between mindfulness and TN. Mindfulness is a mindset 
characterized by weak connections between the self and negative thoughts and feelings 
(Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), associative connections that are the very core of the 
construct of cognitive reactivity. Recent studies confirmed this notion, showing that 
mindfulness and cognitive reactivity are negatively correlated and that after a mindfulness 
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training  negative effects of cognitive reactivity decrease (e.g. Kuyken et al., 2010). 
Moreover, high levels of dispositional mindfulness have been associated with decreased rest-
related activation (Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2010). In sum, individuals with 
high level of mindfulness may, during rest, have a reduced likelihood for self-attitudes and 
negative feelings and thoughts to occur, which mirrors the process of cognitive reactivity in a 
protective manner.  
In our study, we aimed to investigate depression-related cognitive processes that are 
subserved by the DMN through a behavioral resting state paradigm. It has been argued by 
Broyd et al. (2009) that DMN research is crucial in discerning the pathogenesis of psychiatric 
disorders and that the DMN may become valuable in differential diagnosis. Moreover, insight 
into maladaptive cognitive processes during rest can provide new opportunities for clinical 
interventions. We opted for a behavioral resting state approach as, compared to fMRI 
research, it has larger ecological validity. That is, fMRI scanner background noise impacts on 
cognitive control (Hommel, Fischer, Colzato, van den Wildenberg, & Cellini, 2012), and 
suppresses TN activation in a nonlinear way (Gaab, Gabrieli, & Glover, 2008), making any 
conclusion potentially confounded in a non-controllable fashion. To overcome these 
limitations, we used a validated behavioral paradigm which allows making inferences on the 
underlying neural activity (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Specifically, we asked participants 
to rest for about 25 minutes, keep their eyes closed, and avoid any structured thinking. They 
were then pseudo-randomly probed during this resting state about the level of internal and 
external focus. Crucially, in this paradigm event-related higher levels of internal focus have 
been mirrored by higher activation of TN brain areas, such as medioprefrontal cortex and 
posterior cingulate cortex, while more externally-oriented focus has been related to increased 
activation at level of TP (i.e. inferior frontal gyrus and inferior parietal cortex). Moreover, 
internal and external focus showed the anticorrelated pattern typically occurring at the 
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neurobiological level between TN and TP. Also the frequency of the switching internal-
external focus has been reported to be in the same range (<0.1Hz) of DMN fluctuations 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). Compared with standard fRMI studies, our paradigm has the 
advantage to be noise-free and in turn immune from the biasing effect of constant auditory 
stimulation. The resting periods in between thought probes (mean ~19 sec), were chosen to be 
sufficient to elicit consistent DMN activation (Gaab et al., 2008) and for participants to 
experience wandering thoughts (Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 2000).   
We hypothesized that during rest increased levels of internal focus would be the ideal 
condition for rumination-like analytical process to occur and, in turn, detrimentally impact on 
mood. In other words, given the tendency of internal focus towards self-related content, 
higher accessibility of self-salient information could facilitate comparative and judgmental 
processing (Teasdale, 1999), which elicits negative mood (Mor & Winquist, 2002). In accord 
with our neurobiological framework (Marchetti et al., 2012), we expected that negative effects 
of internal focus on mood via contribution of ruminative self-focus would occur only in 
individuals with high levels of habitual brooding tendencies and/or cognitive reactivity. In 
keeping with this, we also predicted the absence of this effect in individuals who adopt a 
mindful perspective towards their thoughts. Moreover, we hypothesized that internal focus 
would only lead to lower mood when self-related information was processed in a ruminative 
way. Otherwise self-related internal focus was not expected per se to lower mood.  
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants  
Eighty-two undergraduates participated in this study. Two cases constituting an outlier 
(z point > 3) were dropped, leaving 80 individuals (mean age=20.5 years, SD=4.5, 80% 
female). The study was approved by the local Ethical Committee.  
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2.2. Materials  
Trait and state questionnaires  
Depressive symptoms level was measured by the Beck Depression Inventory 2
nd
 
Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), whereas trait rumination was assessed by the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Treynor et al., 2003). Then cognitive reactivity and 
mindfulness levels were measured respectively by the Leiden Index of Depression Sensitivity 
– Revised (LEIDS-R; Van der Does & Williams, 2003) and the Mindful Attention Awareness 
Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003).  
Two state measures were acquired. Specifically, state mood was assessed by the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale - State (PANAS – State; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988), whereas state levels of ruminative self-focus were evaluated by the recently validated 
6-item Momentary Ruminative Self-focus Items (MRSI; Mor, Marchetti, & Koster, in 
preparation). Ruminative self-focus is defined as a temporary maladaptive analytical process, 
characterized by “thinking about” experience (Teasdale, 1999).  
 
Resting state paradigm 
Attentional dynamics during rest were studied by means of a validated paradigm 
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011). At the start of the procedure, participants received the 
following instruction: “During the next 25 minutes, we ask you to keep your eyes closed and 
to avoid prolonged structured thinking, such as counting or singing. When you hear a beep, 
please use the keyboard to communicate the intensity of ‘external awareness’ and ‘internal 
awareness’ ongoing prior to the beep. ‘External’ is here defined as the perception of 
environmental sensory stimuli (e.g. auditory, visual, olfactory, or somesthetic). ‘Internal’ here 
refers to all environmental stimuli independent thoughts (e.g. inner speech, autobiographical 
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memories, or wandering thoughts)”. All participants were instructed to respond by using 
button presses from 1 = absent to 7 = maximal. After a training phase of 11 attention probes, 
the experiment phase consisted of 66 attention probes. Interstimulus interval was randomized 
between 11.3 and 26.8 sec. 
This paradigm generates two main variables, “internal focus” (i.e. “internal 
awareness”) and “external focus” (i.e. “external awareness”). For both internal and external 
focus, the mean scores across 66 attention probes were computed. Notably, in our study 
internal and external focus were significantly anticorrelated (r=-.42, p<.001). 
 
2.3. Design 
Participants filled in current mood state measures (PANAS-t0), followed by the state 
measure of ruminative self-focus (MRSI-t0). Then, individuals underwent the resting state 
phase, after which both measures of ruminative self-focus and mood were re-administered 
(respectively MRSI-t1 and PANAS-t1). Finally, questionnaires for individual differences in 
depressive symptoms, rumination, cognitive reactivity, and mindfulness (BDI-II, RRS, 
LEIDS-R, and MAAS) were administered.  
 
2.4. Data-analytic strategy 
We tested the hypothesis that higher levels of internal focus (focal predictor) could 
predict increased ruminative self-focus (intervening variable) after the experimental paradigm 
which in turn could explain higher levels of negative mood (outcome variable) (Figure 1B, C). 
Note that we had theoretical reasons to hypothesize neither total (path c, Figure 1A) nor direct 
(path c’ Figure 1B, C) contribution of the focal predictor on the outcome variable. This type 
of statistical model is defined as indirect effect model (Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). 
Running head: REST, SELF-FOCUS AND NEGATIVE MOOD  
 
10 
 
Additionally, we expected the indirect effect to vary across different levels of moderator(s), 
namely either cognitive reactivity and habitual brooding (Figure 1B) or mindfulness (Figure 
1C). To test such conditional indirect effect, we performed all the analyses with Hayes’ 
(2012) PROCESS macro for SPSS (for more details see the Supplemental Online Material). 
 
3. Results 
Descriptive statistics, Pearson’s correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas are provided in 
Table 1. 
First, we tested the significance of the indirect effect of internal focus (focal predictor) 
on increase of negative mood (outcome variable) through contribution of increased 
ruminative self-focus (intervening variable), across different levels of cognitive risk factors, 
namely cognitive reactivity and trait brooding (Figure 1B). In order to remove noise variance 
unrelated to the focal predictor, we included individual scores on dispositional mindfulness, 
reflection, depressive symptoms, and external focus during the task as covariates
2
.  
Table 2 (upper part) shows that the investigated indirect effect is always significant 
(i.e. bootstrap CIs do not contain zero), with the only exception of low levels of cognitive 
reactivity. Moreover, inspection of the conditional indirect effect coefficients allows inferring 
that brooding has a smaller impact compared with cognitive reactivity; nevertheless given a 
certain level of cognitive reactivity, higher levels of brooding contribute to a stronger indirect 
path. Furthermore, the conditional effect of internal focus per either cognitive reactivity or 
brooding (path a) positively predicts increased ruminative self-focus (respectively β=.28 and 
β=.05), which in turn (path b) positively explains the increase of negative mood (β=.24) (see 
Table S1 in Supplemental Material). On the contrary, the total effect of internal focus in 
predicting increased negative mood (Figure 1A, path c), after controlling for the variables 
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implicated in the previous model, is not significant (see lower part Table S1); neither is the 
direct effect (Figure 1B, path c’) (middle part Table S1). To summarize, higher levels of 
internal focus during rest predict increased levels of negative mood via contribution of 
increased ruminative self-focus. This condition holds only for moderate and high levels of 
cognitive reactivity, whereas the contribution of brooding, although still in line with our 
hypothesis, is smaller. 
Second, we tested the significance of the indirect effect of internal focus (focal 
predictor) on the increase of negative mood (outcome variable) through contribution of 
increased ruminative self-focus (intervening variable), across different levels of mindfulness 
as protective factor (Figure 1C). Here we included the following covariates: external focus, 
depressive symptoms, brooding, reflection, and cognitive reactivity. Table 2 (lower part) 
shows that the investigated indirect effect is always significant, with the exception of high 
levels of mindfulness. As hypothesized, the conditional effect of internal focus moderated by 
mindfulness (path a) negatively predicts increased ruminative self-focus (β=-.18), which in 
turns (path b) positively explains the increase of negative mood (β=.30) (see Table S3). On the 
contrary, neither the total effect (path c) nor the direct effect (path c’) of internal focus 
significantly predicted increased negative mood, after controlling for variables included in the 
conditional indirect effect model (see middle and lower part Table S3). To summarize, higher 
levels of internal focus during rest positively predict increased levels of negative mood via 
contribution of increased ruminative self-focus. This condition does not hold for individuals 
showing high levels of dispositional mindfulness. 
 
4. Discussion 
Rest is increasingly being the focus of intense research and several neurobiological 
abnormalities have been reported during resting state in psychopathology (Whitfield-Gabrieli 
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& Ford, 2012). Resting state provides an interesting condition to study depressive cognitive 
risk factors and protective factors (Marchetti et al., 2012) as behavioral and 
neuropsychological studies have associated rest with heightened levels of self-related 
processing (Northoff, 2012). Nevertheless, little is known about depressogenic cognitive 
processes during rest. Therefore, we adopted a behavioral noise-free paradigm to study 
cognitive processes that influence mood during resting state. The main finding of our study is 
that there is an indirect effect of internal focus on negative mood through ruminative self-
focus when individuals have moderate to high cognitive reactivity, whereas brooding seems 
to have only an incremental effect. This indirect path is not significant in individuals with low 
cognitive reactivity (regardless of brooding levels), or high mindfulness levels.  
The significant indirect path indicates that internally focused attention is a condition 
that can facilitate judgmental and analytical thinking, which subsequently heightens negative 
mood. This is in line with theories relating self-focused attention to negative mood and 
depression (Ingram, 1990). It is noteworthy that internal focus during rest did not overlap with 
state ruminative self-focus, as these two variables were only moderately correlated.  
Crucially, our data strongly indicates that there are individual differences in the 
affective consequences of being internally focused during rest (i.e. conditional indirect 
effect). On the one hand, cognitive reactivity levels strongly determined the strength by which 
internal focus predicted worsening in mood via ruminative self-focus. On the other hand, 
brooding appears to have only an incremental effect in that, given a certain level of cognitive 
reactivity, brooding augmented the indirect effect without actually influencing individuals 
with low levels of cognitive reactivity. It is noteworthy that we have been able to specify the 
contribution of cognitive reactivity above and beyond maladaptive rumination, as shown in 
previous research (Moulds et al., 2008). Although being highly correlated (r=.60), these two 
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constructs show a hierarchical asymmetry in moderating the indirect effect, with cognitive 
reactivity dominating over brooding.  
Our study also shows individual difference variables that have a protective effect in 
such contexts. Individuals with high levels of mindfulness did not experience a worsening in 
mood. The construct of mindfulness is thought to represent weakened links between the self, 
(negative) thinking, and (negative) feelings (Way et al., 2010), and in turn to conceptually 
oppose cognitive reactivity (Marchetti et al., 2012, Raes et al., 2009). Correlational analysis 
confirms this hypothesis, showing that mindfulness negatively correlates only with cognitive 
reactivity, but not with brooding
3
. A possible explanation for this result is that, despite the 
emergence of self-related material during rest, mindful individuals are capable of not 
engaging in a self-judgmental loop.  
Why is this study of resting state of theoretical and clinical importance? Typically 
during rest when there is time for self-reflection, individuals experience the most negative 
thoughts. However, such conditions have so far rarely been investigated in lab contexts. The 
current paradigm used is highly promising to further study rest-related phenomena in 
psychopathology, with a strong link to rapidly advancing DMN research (Whitfield-Gabrieli 
& Ford, 2012). Although the current paradigm is less informative about the neural 
mechanisms, it is noteworthy that resting state as studied through this behavioral paradigm 
has a larger ecological validity than studies using fMRI. By capitalizing on this, we aimed to 
bridge the extant gap between clinical theories and basic neuroscience. Second, our findings 
provide evidence for interplay between cognitive risk as well as protective factors. In line 
with a recent proposal (Marchetti et al., 2012), we could relate different aspects of depression 
risk to resting state and DMN. Especially observing these relations in a sample of healthy, 
non-depressed participants suggests that there are strong relations between resting state, 
negative thinking, and negative mood which can turn toxic even in individuals with limited 
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levels of psychopathology. Therefore, it is conceivable that clinically depressed individuals 
during rest might show stronger effects. Our findings can also account for the clinical 
observation that task engagement can lift negative mood (Hopko, Lejuez, Ruggiero, & Eifert, 
2003). Finally, in relation to clinical interventions, mindfulness has promising effects in 
decreasing cognitive risk factors (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). Given the high frequency of (short) 
resting state phases in everyday life, it appears important for at-risk individuals (e.g., remitted 
depressed individuals) to develop mindful skills which can protect them from negative 
consequences associated with rest.  
Our study has limitations. First, despite a strong link has been established between 
internal/external focus and the DMN activity during rest (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011), in 
our study we can only indirectly relate our results to activity of underlying neural 
mechanisms. Second, our study is correlational in nature so no conclusions can be drawn 
regarding causal relationships. Therefore, future studies should further investigate the 
reported effects by directly manipulating the degree of internal focus during rest. Third, the 
presence of probes during the task might have influenced the investigated phenomenon. 
However, previous research on mindwandering has shown that assessment of mindwandering 
using thought probes generates similar results as and, sometimes, better than retrospective 
reports (Hurlburt & Melancon, 1987).  
To conclude, we found that internal focus has a detrimental effect on negative mood 
through ruminative self-focus only when individuals have moderate to high cognitive 
reactivity, whereas this is not the case in low cognitive reactivity or high levels of 
mindfulness. Resting state clearly is a pivotal moment where negative cognitions can creep up 
on individuals. Our study attempted to bridge the literature on cognitive and neural 
mechanisms involved in resting state, which increases our understanding of risk as well as 
protective influences. 
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Footnotes 
1
: Impaired attentional control will not be considered here as it is proposed to specifically 
occur in the transition between rest and task. 
 
2
: Mindfulness is considered to negatively mirror cognitive reactivity as it also emerged in the 
correlational analysis (r=-.42). By controlling for mindfulness, we were able to estimate the 
particular effect of cognitive reactivity above and beyond mindfulness. For the same reason, 
we included reflection. Despite their positive relation, reflection and brooding have been 
reported to show an opposite relationship in relation to the TN at neurobiological level 
(Berman et al., 2011; Hamilton et al., 2011). This observation was confirmed by the opposite 
role of both reflection and brooding in predicting the increase of ruminative self-focus (see 
upper part Table S1). Moreover, individual level of dysphoria was included given its well-
established contribution to rumination and negative mood. Importantly, none of the 
covariates, except for external focus (r=-.42), was significantly correlated with the focal 
predictor, a condition which makes such statistical controlling fully appropriate (Miller & 
Chapman, 2001). External focus was included as covariate to ensure that findings obtained for 
internal focus were not due to dynamics related to external focus of attention. 
 
3
: This pattern holds even after controlling for brooding (rp=-.382, p<.001), on the contrary the 
relation between brooding and mindfulness is reduced to zero after controlling for cognitive 
reactivity (rp=.07, p=ns).  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Hypothesized conditional indirect effect models. 1A represents the total effect of 
internal focus in predicting increased negative mood (path c). 1B represents the model 
for cognitive risk factors, that is both the direct effect (path c’) and conditional indirect 
effect per different levels cognitive reactivity and brooding (path axb) are depicted. 1C 
represents the model for protective factor, that is both the direct effect (path c’) and 
conditional indirect effect per different levels of mindfulness (path axb) are shown.  
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Table 1. Mean, standard deviation and Cronbach’s alpha (n = 80) 
 M SD (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1)  Internal Focus 4.86 0.93 -.42*** .46*** .03 .36*** .11 -.07 .02 -.13 .01 -.13 .02 -.10 -.01 
(2) External Focus 2.88 0.84 - -.09 .08 .00 .05 .18 .23* .18 .06 .16 .02 .01 -.03 
(3)  Δ MRSI t1-t0 2.30 4.85  - -.15 .59*** .25* -.01 .19 -.05 .06 -.18 .17 .00 .05 
(4) MRSI-t0 23.31 5.54   (.68) .71*** -.09 .30** .23* .34*** .34*** .22* .35*** .26** -.04 
(5) MRSI-t1 25.61 6.80    (.79) .10 .24* .33*** .25* .32* .05 .41*** .21 .00 
(6)  Δ PANAS negative t1-t0 -1.05 3.23     - -.43*** .36*** -.11 -.07 -.05 -.15 -.21 .07 
(7) PANAS negative-t0 14.28 4.14      (.80) .69*** .51*** .20 .06 .31** .17 -.07 
(8) PANAS negative-t1 13.23 4.02       (.81) .43*** .15 .02 .19 .01 -.02 
(9) BDI-II 9.41 6.53        (.87) .31* .20 .28** .27** -.16 
(10) RRS Total 45.27 12.23         (.91) .69*** .80*** .66*** -.13 
(11) RRS Reflection 10.18 3.81          (.82) .32** .38*** .00 
(12) RRS Brooding 10.45 3.50           (.78) .60*** -.20 
(13) LEIDS-R 42.61 16.54            (.88) -.42*** 
(14) MAAS 3.75 0.61             (.78) 
Note. ***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05.  The values between parentheses are Cronbach’s alphas.  Δ MRSI t1-t0 = differential score between MRSI indexes after (t1) and before (t0) rest-
related paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of ruminative self-focus at time 2, controlling for time 1. Δ PANAS negative t1-t0 = differential score between PANAS negative 
indexes after (t1) and before (t0) rest-related paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of negative mood at time 2, controlling for time 1. 
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Table 2.  Conditional indirect effect of internal focus on the increase of negative mood 
across low (-1 SD), medium (M) and high (+1) levels of cognitive reactivity and brooding 
via increased ruminative self-focus (upper part); conditional indirect effect across low (-1 
SD), medium (M) and high (+1) levels of mindfulness (lower part)(n = 80) 
Cognitive 
reactivity 
Brooding Conditional 
indirect effect 
Boot SE Boot LL CI 
95%  
Boot UL CI 
95% 
Low 
Low .16 .15 -.02 .65 
Medium .21 .16 -.02 .66 
High .26 .28 -.11 1.11 
Medium 
Low .39 .29 .01 1.15 
Medium .44 .24 .01 .96 
High .49 .29 .03 1.20 
High 
Low .62 .45 .03 1.91 
Medium .66 .39 .01 1.58 
High .71 .39 .01 1.55 
     Mindfulness Conditional indirect effect 
Boot SE Boot LL CI 
95%  
Boot UL CI 
95% 
 Low .74 .36 .13 1.55 
 Medium .49 .23 .09 1.02 
 High .25 .23 -.06 .92 
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Data-analytic strategy 
In our study, we aimed at testing a specific statistical model where only the indirect 
effect (axb) is expected to be significant, neither the total (c) nor the direct effect (c’) is 
expected to be significant. Indirect effect model is a term which has been proposed to 
differentiate from full and partial meditational models where significant either total or direct 
effects are expected (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). In keeping with the guidelines proposed by 
Mathieu and Taylor (2006), we first tested the statistical significance of the indirect effect, 
operationalized as the product of path a and b. We then tested the null total effect of the focal 
predictor on the outcome variable without taking into account the contribution of the 
intervening variable (Figure 1A). We also tested the null effect of the direct path (c’), namely 
the contribution of the focal predictor on the outcome after controlling for the intervening 
variable. When these three conditions were satisfied, we could test whether the relation 
between the focal predictor and the outcome is due to an indirect effect through the 
contribution of the intervening variable (Hayes, 2009; Hayes, Preacher, & Myers, 2011; 
Mathieu & Taylor, 2006). Nevertheless, the test of the indirect effect model was performed on 
data that were only partially structured to be temporally consistent with the proposed 
underlying process, with the intervening variable (increased ruminative self-focus) and the 
outcome variable (increased negative mood) being measured at the same time. In order to 
control for the alternative indirect  path (reversed model), the data were subjected to an 
analysis in which the increased negative mood served as intervening variable and the 
enhanced ruminative self-focus as outcome. If the results of this reversed model were also 
significant, caution would be warranted (Kenny, 2012). 
To test the statistical significance of the indirect effect (path axb), according to 
Preacher and Hayes’ recommendations (2008) we adopted the nonparametric bootstrapping 
approach. Compared with the causal steps approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986) or the Sobel test 
(Sobel, 1982), bootstrapping is considered the most powerful approach and free from 
unrealistic assumptions, such as the multivariate normality in data distribution (Bollen & 
Stine, 1990; Hayes, 2009). Specifically, bootstrapping circumvents this problem by relying on 
confidence intervals (CIs) for the determination of the indirect effect instead of the traditional 
p-value approach that uses standard errors (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2002). 
According to Preacher and Hayes (2008), to test the significance of the indirect effect (path 
axb) we estimated 10000 bootstrap bias-corrected 95% CIs, and if they did not contain zero 
they were considered significant. Crucially, to determine the significance of the indirect effect 
(axb path) we evaluated only the bootstrap CIs without considering the significance of path a 
and b, as recommended by Hayes (2009, 2012). Regressions weights for both path a and b 
were computed only to clarify the direction of the influence of the focal predictor over the 
intervening variable (path a) and the intervening variable over the outcome variable (path b).  
Furthermore, we put forward the indirect effect to vary across different levels of the 
moderator(s), either cognitive reactivity and brooding (Figure 1B) or mindfulness (Figure 
1C). For both models, we estimated different conditional indirect effects of the focal predictor 
over the outcome variable at low (one SD below the mean), moderate (sample mean), and 
high (one SD above the mean) values of the moderator(s). Following Cohen, Cohen, West, 
and Aiken (2003), both the focal predictor and the moderator(s) were mean-centered prior 
calculating the interaction term(s). 
Additional Analyses 
We tested the reversed models, where increased negative mood acts as intervening variable 
and increased ruminative self-focus acts as outcome variable, by estimating the indirect effect. 
Specifically, we ruled out the statistical significance of the reversed models for both cognitive 
risk factors (TableS2, upper part) and protective factor (TableS2, lower part).   
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Table S1. Summary regressions for the total and direct effect of internal focus over 
increased negative mood conditioned to cognitive reactivity and brooding via increased 
ruminative self-focus (n = 80) 
Δ MRSI t1-t0 Predictor B SE B β R2 
 BDI-II -.01 .07 -.01  
 Reflection -.37 .13 -.29**  
 Brooding  .35 .16 .25*  
 LEIDS-R .03 .04 .09  
 MAAS 1.59 .86 .20  
 External focus 1.01 .62 .17  
 Internal focus 2.76 .54 .53***  
 Internal focus x LEIDS-R (a) .08 .04 .28*  
 Internal focus x Brooding (a) .08 .21 .05 .401*** 
Δ PANAS 
negative t1-t0 
Predictor B SE B β R2 
 BDI-II -.05 .06 -.11  
 Reflection .00 .10 .00  
 MAAS .22 .60 .04  
 External focus .44 .48 .11  
 Internal focus (c’) .13 .48 .04  
 Δ MRSI t1-t0 (b) .16 .08 .24 .086 
Δ PANAS 
negative t1-t0 
Predictor B SE B β R2 
 BDI-II -.03 .06 -.06  
 Reflection .04 .11 .05  
 Brooding -.05 .13 -.06  
 LEIDS-R -.03 .03 -.17  
 MAAS -.12 .68 -.02  
 External focus .48 .49 .13  
 Internal focus (c) .52 .44 .15 .073 
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.  Δ MRSI t1-t0 = differential score between MRSI indexes after (t1) 
and before (t0) rest-related paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of ruminative self-focus at time 2, 
controlling for time 1. Δ PANAS negative t1-t0 = differential score between PANAS negative indexes after 
(t1) and before (t0) rest-related paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of negative mood at time 2, 
controlling for time 1. 
  
 
 
  
Table S2.  Conditional indirect effect of internal focus on the increase of ruminative self-
focus across  low (-1 SD), medium (M) and high (+1)levels of cognitive reactivity and 
brooding via increased negative mood (reversed model) (upper part); conditional indirect 
effect across low (-1 SD), medium (M) and high (+1) levels of mindfulness (reversed 
model) (lower part)(n = 80) 
Cognitive 
reactivity 
Brooding Conditional 
indirect effect 
Boot SE Boot LL CI 
95%  
Boot UL CI 
95% 
Low 
Low -.03 .19 -.51 .31 
Medium .11 .23 -.21 .78 
High .26 .37 -.24 1.37 
Medium 
Low .01 .21 -.34 .53 
Medium .16 .18 -.03 .72 
High .30 .30 -.06 1.18 
High 
Low 05 .31 -.43 .92 
Medium .20 .24 -.05 .97 
High .34 .31 -.02 1.20 
Mindfulness Conditional 
indirect effect 
Boot SE Boot LL CI 
95%  
Boot UL CI 
95% 
 High .27 .26 -.05 .98 
 Medium .16 .19 -.08 .74 
 Low .06 .26 -.42 .68 
 
 Table S3.  Summary regressions for the total and direct effect of internal focus over 
increased negative mood conditioned to mindfulness via increased ruminative self-focus (n 
= 80) 
Δ MRSI t1-t0 Predictor B SE B β R2 
 BDI-II -.00 .08 -.01  
 Reflection -.28 .14 -.22*  
 Brooding  .26 .17 .19  
 LEIDS-R .01 .04 .05  
 MAAS 1.30 .89 .16  
 External focus .88 .63 .15  
 Internal focus 2.52 .57 .48***  
 Internal focus x MAAS (a) -2.00 1.15 -.18 .335*** 
Δ PANAS 
negative t1-t0 
Predictor B SE B β R2 
 BDI-II -.02 .06 -.05  
 Reflection .09 .10 .11  
 Brooding -.12 .13 -.13  
 LEIDS-R -.03 .03 -.16  
 External focus .32 .48 .08  
 Internal focus (c’) .02 .48 .00  
 Δ MRSI t1-t0 (b) .20 .09 .30* .135 
Δ PANAS 
negative t1-t0 
Predictor B SE B β R2 
 BDI-II -.03 .06 -.06  
 Reflection .04 .11 .05  
 Brooding -.05 .13 -.06  
 LEIDS-R -.03 .03 -.17  
 MAAS -.12 .68 -.02  
 External focus .48 .49 .13  
 Internal focus (c) .52 .44 .15 .073 
Note. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05.  Δ MRSI t1-t0 = differential score between MRSI indexes after (t1) 
and before (t0) rest-related paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of ruminative self-focus at time 2, 
controlling for time 1. Δ PANAS negative t1-t0 = differential score between PANAS negative indexes after 
(t1) and before (t0) rest-related paradigm. Higher scores represent an increase of negative mood at time 2, 
controlling for time 1. 
